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Abstract—Despite the significant economic benefits derived 
from the continuously increasing number of visitors entering 
the European Union through land-border crossing points or 
sea ports, novel solutions, such as next generation mobile 
devices for passenger identification for land and sea border 
control, are required to promote the comfort of passengers. 
However, the highly sensitive information handled by these 
devices makes them an attractive target for attackers. 
Therefore, strong user authentication and authorization 
mechanisms are required. Towards this direction, we provide 
an overview of user authentication and authorization 
requirements for this new type of devices based on the NIST 
Special Publication 500-280v2.1.   
Keywords—border control security, mobile passenger ID 
devices, user authentication and authorization 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Transport is a fundamental sector for and of the world 
economy. According to the European Commission [1], 
transport services encompass a diverse and complex network 
comprising around 1.2 million private and public enterprises 
across the EU, employing approximately 11 million people 
and delivering products and services to EU residents, 
companies and its trading partners. Efficient transport 
services and infrastructure are a cornerstone component to 
exploiting the economic strengths of the European Union, 
and to empowering cohesion both at economic and social 
level. While airports are of an acceptable standard transport 
services and infrastructure, land border crossing points and 
sea ports require more research and investment for novel 
efficient solutions, such as next generation mobile devices 
for passenger identification for land and sea border control.  
The next generation mobile devices for passenger 
identification for land and sea border control comprise a 
promising and innovative solution for accurate passenger 
identification “on the fly” while ensuring passenger´s 
comfort. However, the highly sensitive and confidential 
information handled by these devices makes them 
susceptible to data loss, data theft and data misuse. In order 
to ensure high level of device security to protect sensitive 
data handled by these devices, strong user authentication and 
authorization mechanisms are required [2]. Towards this 
direction, we provide an overview of user authentication and 
authorization requirements for this new type of devices based 
on the NIST Special Publication 500-280v2.1 [3]. Besides 
that, we also present a set of use cases in order to give 
researchers a better understanding of this new type of devices 
and of their requirements in terms of user authentication and 
authorization. Moreover, an overview of existing user 
authentication and authorization mechanisms for smartphone 
devices is given in order to provide a foundation for 
organizing research efforts towards the design and 
development of proper user authentication and authorization 
mechanisms for next generation mobile passenger ID devices 
for land and sea border control. We focus on user 
authentication and authorization mechanisms for smartphone 
devices since it is anticipated that the next generation mobile 
passenger ID devices will be devices with capabilities similar 
to those of smartphone devices.   
Following the Introduction, the rest of the paper is 
organized as follows. Section II presents a set of use cases 
for next generation mobile passenger ID devices for land and 
sea border control. User authentication and authorization 
requirements for this new type of devices are described in 
Section III, while an overview of existing user authentication 
and authorization mechanisms for smartphone devices is 
provided in Section IV. Finally, the paper is concluded in 
Section V. 
II. USE CASES FOR NEXT GENERATION MOBILE 
PASSENGER ID DEVICES FOR LAND AND SEA BORDER 
CONTROL 
The purpose of this section is to present a set of use cases 
as part of a foundation for understanding the necessary 
security requirements for next generation mobile passenger 
ID devices for land and sea border control. To develop these 
use cases, we relied on NISTIR 8196 “Security Analysis of 
First Responder Mobile and Wearable Devices”, where 
several cases from reputable public safety organizations were 
identified, surveyed, and analyzed [4]. 
A. Mobile Information Collection and Sharing 
 While in the land or sea border control, an officer is 
utilizing the next generation mobile passenger ID device to 
record and capture relevant identification information, but 
not biometric information covered in II.C, for a passenger. 
This information may be stored on the officer’s mobile 
device or relayed to the backend platform where the 
information is processed or analysed further by specific 
algorithms, stored in backend databases, and/or reviewed by 
investigators, supervisors, and other command staff. 
Nevertheless, the data stored on the officer’s mobile device 
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or transmitted to the backend platform may be unencrypted, 
allowing easy access of information by unauthorized users. 
B. Shared Equipment with Multiple Users 
A border control officer selects a device from a charging 
station. Although this device is different from the device the 
officer used before, the officer logs into the device. After 
login, the device is automatically configured with the 
officer’s profile settings. However, the officer may have 
unauthorized access to sensitive information that was 
authorized for a previous user in this mobile device. For 
instance, collected and stored, on the device, passenger 
identification data may be exposed to unauthorized users. 
Furthermore, it is possible that the default device settings 
may be incorrectly assigned (e.g., higher access level user 
incorrectly assigned to a lower access level user). In addition, 
location data and officer information may also be incorrectly 
associated with the previous user.  
C. Gathering and Processing Biometric Information 
 The capability of the next generation mobile passenger 
ID device to capture and validate accurately the passenger´s 
biometric information is a cornerstone component for 
efficient land and sea border control applications. A border 
control officer makes use of biometric sensors to capture 
biometrics to facilitate the identification of the passenger. 
Similar to the captured relevant identification information, 
considered in II.A, the biometric information is transmitted 
to the backend platform for processing and storage. Then, the 
officer receives the processing results that lead to improved 
situational awareness and enable an informed action. 
Thefore, data in transit and data at rest protection for the 
biometric information is important and can be achieved by 
encrypting the transmitted or stored data, respectively. Data 
encryption can protect against unauthorized extraction or 
modification of the data in transit or at rest.  
D. Lost or Stolen Device 
There is the possibility that an officer loses his/her 
mobile passenger ID device (e.g., during a break of his/her 
duty) or an individual steals the device intentionally. In the 
case that the officer loses the mobile passenger ID device, 
thereafter an unauthorized user may find the device and try 
to login and access the stored information and applications 
on the mobile passenger ID device. Similar to the lost device 
case, when an individual steals the mobile passenger ID 
device of the officer, the individual may be able to access 
critical information stored on it. In both cases, the level of 
ease to obtain unauthorized access to sensitive information 
significantly depends on the authentication and authorization 
mechanisms supported by the mobile passenger ID device. 
III. USER AUTHENTICATION AND AUTHORIZATION 
REQUIREMENTS  
In this section, we provide an overview of the user (i.e., 
officer) authentication and authorization requirements for 
this new type of devices based on the NIST Special 
Publication 500-280v2.1 [3]. 
A. Officer Authentication & Authorization  
The next generation mobile passenger ID device should 
provide the means for an officer to authenticate his/her 
identity and enable authorization levels for that person 
depending on a two-factor authentication.  
• Two-factor Authentication: The next generation 
mobile passenger ID device should provide the 
means for a two-factor authentication. The one 
should be a biometric, while the other may be a 
strong password, e.g. of minimum length with 
alphabetical/ numeric/ special characters. 
• Officer Re-Authentication: The next generation 
mobile passenger ID device should provide the 
means for an officer to re-authenticate his/her 
identity after a default time of using the mobile 
device or device inactivity, or after a shut-off. 
• Failed Officer Authentication Attempts or Unknown 
Device Location: The next generation mobile 
passenger ID device should have the capability to 
lock itself or to render itself inoperable and/or erase 
selective or all data stored on the device (e.g., a 
remote data “wiping” capability) as a result of a 
maximum limit of failed authentication attempts or 
an unknown device location. In these cases, the 
device should require unlock only by an IT 
administrator. 
B. Device Authentication & Authorization:  
The next generation mobile passenger ID device should be 
authenticated and authorized by the backend platform right 
after the completion of the officer authentication and 
authorization process as well as before establishing any 
communication with the platform for data transmission. The 
device identification should be firstly verified against a 
registered list, stored on the platform, of specified devices 
(e.g., lost or stolen) before being authorized. A device with a 
matching identification to one of the list should not be 
authenticated and an alert should be generated...    
IV. RELATED WORK ON USER AUTHENTICATION AND 
AUTHORIZATION FOR SMARTPHONE DEVICES 
 User authentication and authorization are fundamental 
security objectives for the security of the the next generation 
mobile passenger ID devices. As these devices comprise a 
novel solution for accurate “on the fly” passenger 
identification, no specific user authentication and 
authorization mechanisms for this kind of devices have been 
developed so far. However, it is anticipated that the next 
generation mobile passenger ID devices will be devices with 
similar capabilities to those of smartphone devices.  
Therefore, in this section, we give an overview of existing 
user authentication and authorization mechanisms for 
smartphone devices in order to provide a foundation for 
organizing research efforts towards the design and 
development of proper user authentication and authorization 
mechanisms for next generation mobile passenger ID devices 
for land and sea border control. 
A. Means of Authentication 
In this section, we review the recent literature 
emphasizing on the commonly used user authentication 
mechanisms on smartphones, and that, potentially, could be a 
basis for designing and developing proper user authentication 
mechanisms for the next generation mobile passenger ID 
devices for land and sea border control applications. User 
authentication techniques may be divided into three main 
categories, depending on which of the following the security 
is based: something known, something possessed, and 
something inherent [5]. 
1) Something known. Examples of this category include 
standard passwords, Personal Identification Numbers 
(PINs), graphical patterns, and the secret or private keys 
whose knowledge is demonstrated in challenge-response 
protocols [5]. Gupta et al. [6] presented the commonly used 
ways and classified numerous types to achieve 
authentication in smartphones. According to their review 
article, knowledge-based schemes are generally used as one-
shot, periodic, single sign-on (SSO) and static authentication 
mechanism types. More specifically, one-shot authentication 
is a type of authentication mechanism in which the user 
authentication is proceed only at the beginning of the 
session. Once user authentication is established, the user has 
unlimited access to the device and the authentication 
remains valid until the user signs off or closes the session. 
This mechanism type could violate the requirement of 
Officer Re-Authentication that is described in Section III. 
On the other hand, periodic authentication mechanism is 
simply the variant of ``one-shot authentication´´ with the 
addition of a default timeout duration, after which the user 
has to re-authenticate himself. Additionally, the SSO 
authentication mechanism type permits the user to remain 
signed on using valid login credentials until the session is 
terminated or the user revoked. In case, if the system detects 
any abnormality with respect to fix set of attributes, e.g. the 
user location or the network connection, the session is 
closed or user re-authentications is requested [6]. For 
instance, Google provides G Suite apps with SSO 
mechanisms for Android devices which can be achieved by 
pairing smartphones with wearable devices such as 
smartwatches [7]. Finally, the static authentication 
mechanism type requests a fixed set of challenges to 
authenticate the users. 
According to the recent studies [8], the aforementioned 
conventional user authentication techniques are no more 
considered secure and convinient for the user. First of all, 
these techniques are not able to distinguish the users, rather 
they authenticate everyone with the valid credentials. Despite 
this, they require users to memorize their passwords to 
unlock the device every time that is needed. At [9], Zhang at 
al. describe the difficulties of the users in memorizing and 
correctly recalling the several passwords. As a consequence, 
the users set easy or simple passwords to remember  making 
the mobile devices vulnerable to numerous attacks, e.g. 
guessing. Alternatively, Android users tend to set graphical 
patterns for device unlocking. Nevertheless, this approach 
requires users to memorize them too, and thus, users choose 
simple patterns and an attacker could possible guess or 
observe the pattern. Researchers collected unique graphical 
patterns from 215 users, and cracked the 95% of those 
patterns within just five attempts [10]. 
2) Something possesed. This is typically a physical 
accessory, resembling a passport in function. Examples 
include magnetic-striped cards, chipcards or smart cards,  
hand-held customized calculators (password generators) 
which provide time-variant passwords and tokens [5]. For 
instance, smartphone applications (e.g., e-banking and e-
wallet) that handle sensitive information enable two-factor 
authentication techniques such as one-time passcodes 
(OTPs) along with the usual username and password 
authentication. For the passcodes generation, the service 
providers often supply a small security device to each user, 
or the passcode could be sent via SMS on the user´s 
smartphone [6]. OTP scheme could be easily implemented 
on mobile devices. Additionally, the user is able to generate 
even offline the passcode using the mobile app provided by 
the service provider, or with the pairing of another (often 
wearable) device, such as smartwatches or smartglasses [6]. 
Secure device pairing schemes allow access to the 
smartphones by pairing it with a trusted Bluetooth device 
and use the same to unlock the phone. However, OTP 
solutions do not ensure the confidentiality of the generated 
passcodes as they are vulnerable to Man-In-The-Middle 
attacks (MITM) and Man-In-The-PC/Phone (MITPC/P) 
attacks. As per the Verizon Data Breach Investigations 
Report [11], NIST stopped recommending the two-factor 
user authentication via SMS, as malicious code infesting 
mobile endpoints could surreptitiously capture second 
factors delivered by SMS or offline OTP generated using 
apps. On top of that, in-depth security and usability studies 
[12], [13], [14], [15] mentioned that OTP schemes result 
more cost to the user and are comparatively slower, as they 
may require an additional hardware for the only purpose of 
authentication. Regarding those studies, users consider the 
OTP-based authentication not a convenient for the user 
solution. The analysis [16] shows that the users are facing 
several problems due to mistyped passcodes for example. 
 Gupta et al. [6] mention that token-based authentication 
schemes are used in the type of risk-based authentication 
mechanism. According to review article [6], risk-based 
authentication schemes are mostly based on a continuous 
decision to accept or reject user authentication. This decision 
depends on the comparison of a risk score computed in real-
time with the stored risk profiles of the users, and then the 
system challenges the users for authentication, accordingly. 
For instance, when an officer is using the next generation 
mobile ID device from a verified secure location (land or sea 
border control workplace), re-authentication should not be 
required. While in case of an unknown or nonverified 
location, the service may require additional evidence about 
the identity of the user and thus asking for re-authentication. 
Nowadays, risk-based authentication schemes tend to offer 
frictionless user authentication while enhancing security and 
promoting user´s comfort [6], [16], [17], [18]. 
3) Something inherent. This category includes methods 
which make use of human physical characteristics and 
involuntary actions (biometrics), such as handwritten 
signatures, fingerprints, voice, retinal patterns, hand 
geometries, and dynamic keyboarding characteristics [5]. 
Gupta et al. [6] have further classified this category as 
physiological and behavioral biometrics. 
a) Physiological Biometrics. Regarding the 
physiological biometrics, for example, face, fingerprint and 
iris recognition, the mobile device manufacturers have 
started embedding the corresponding biosensors in order to 
capture them and utilize them for accurate and convenient 
user authentication. For instance, Apple, Huawei, Samsung, 
Nokia have already developed iris scanners and fingerprint 
sensors in some of their recently launched smartphones. 
Despite that the physiological biometrics are considered 
secure due to the fact that they are unique, they have shown 
to be vulnerable to  different types of attacks such a 
impersonation. More specifically, the face of a user, 
nowadays, could be easily found on social media websites, 
while the fingerprint could be extracted from the gestures on 
some photos. Recent researchers has shown that these 
physiological biometric schemes can be hacked easily with a 
cheap equipment and not very sophisticated algorithms. For 
instance, iPhone X Face ID was hacked with a 3D printed 
mask of its owner face costing around 150 dollars [19], 
while with a simple photo of the owner, researches unlocked 
the Samsung S8 [20]. Similarly, the German Chaos 
Computer Club hacked the iPhone 5S fingerprint scanner by 
photographing the glass surface with the user´s fingerprint, 
and then creating a thin film with a fake one within two days 
after Apple launched iPhone 5S worldwide [21]. 
Additionally, the researcher Isao Echizen from Japan´s 
National Institute of Informatics (NII) shown that fake 
fingerprints can be easily created from a simple photo with 
the peace sign taken just from three meters away, and they 
can unlock the device without any sophisticated process 
[22]. This is a proof that there is a need for novel solutions 
and more sophisticated algorithms to exploit the advantages 
of uniqueness of the physiological biometrics. 
For instance, it is worthwhile to mention the Face ID 
advanced technology that is already applied in some recent 
iPhone models (e.g., iPhone XR, iPhone 11) and iPad 
models (e.g., iPad Pro) [23]. Face ID revolutionizes user 
authentication by means of facial recognition providing 
secure authentication enabled by the state-of-the-art 
TrueDepth camera system with advanced machine learning 
technologies to accurately map the geometry of the face of 
the user. More precisely, the TrueDepth projects and 
analyzes over 30.000 invisible dots in order to create a depth 
map of user´s face. Consequently, the camera captures 
accurate face data together with an infrared image of the 
face. Then, advanced software transforms the depth map and 
the infrared image into a mathematical representation. Every 
time that the user attempts to login, the software compares 
that representation to the enrolled facial data. Additionally, 
Face ID automatically adapts to changes in user´s 
appearance, such as growing facial hair. If there is a more 
significant change, before it updates the face data, Face ID 
is able to authenticate the user by using a set passcode. Face 
ID is designed to work with numerous accessories like hats, 
scarves, glasses, contact lenses, and many sunglasses. 
Furthermore, it's designed to work indoors, outdoors, and 
even in total darkness. On top of that, all Face ID data - 
including mathematical representations of the face - is 
encrypted and protected. According to statistics [23], the 
probability that a random individual could fool the Face ID 
and unlock it is approximately 1 in 1,000,000 with a single 
enrolled appearance. As an additional security protection, 
Face ID requires the passcode after five unsuccessful match 
attempts. Finally, Face ID matches against depth 
information, and so it cannot be fooled from a print or 2D 
digital photographs. It's designed to protect against spoofing 
by masks or other techniques by using sophisticated anti-
spoofing neural networks. Face ID is even attention-aware 
and can identify if the eyes are open and the attention is 
focused on the smartphone device.. 
b) Behavioral Biometrics. User authentication based 
on behavioral biometrics is considered as the future of user 
authentication for sensitive applications performed with 
mobile devices [24]. For instance, for the next generation 
mobile passenger ID devices for land and sea border control, 
behavioral biometric-based solutions are very promising. 
Although the behavioral biometrics are not considered 
unique enough for ensuring user identification, they have 
proved efficient for user authentication. Additionally, 
combining two or more modalities can improve the accuracy 
and enhance the security. These schemes can work as an 
additional transparent authentication layer, that enhance the 
existing authentication mechanisms without affecting the 
usage of the device [5], [24], [25], [26]. Research efforts 
have been already started in gait recognition, keystroke or 
touch dynamics and voice recognition behavioral biometric 
modalities [5], [25]. 
• Gait recognition is the process of authenticating the 
user based on his/her walking style [6]. Recently, 
smartphones and wearable devices have started 
developing schemes for user authentication by means 
of gait recognition. Most of the researchers [27], [28], 
[29] presented gait-based solution that they are 
implemented together with a wearable sensor. The 
results are promising, although more testing is 
required to ensure robustness against impersonation 
attacks. However, for the next generation mobile 
passenger ID devices for land and sea border control, 
the gait-based solution with a wearable device is not 
so convenient, considering that the officer may move 
long distances, and also regarding the large number of 
the officers working (e.g., cost of many sensors). On 
the other hand, a gait-based solution implemented by 
some in-built sensors, such as the accelerometer or 
the gyroscope, could possible fit better in the land and 
sea border control application.  
• Keystroke or touch dynamics refers to the user´s 
characteristics while typing due to timing differences 
or different pressure. Researchers consider them 
efficient, and since they do not require a special 
hardware, they have been widely evaluated [6], [30], 
[31], [32].  Most of the proposed schemes examine 
the way of typing while users entering their 
credentials in order to sign into their online banking 
apps. This modality potentially could be integrated 
for the user authentication for the next generation 
mobile passenger ID devices for land and sea border 
control as an additional authentication level when for 
instance the face recognition fails, and the system 
asks for the passcode.      
• Research efforts have been addressed to voice 
recognition experimented on public databases [33]. 
They digitalized the voice of the user, and then 
compute the Mel Frequency Cepstral Coefficients 
(MFCCs) and the Euclidean distance. The results 
could potentially enhance the performance of the 
traditional biometric systems and broaden the 
landscape of the continuous user authentication. 
To sum up, considering a smartphone device, the face 
physiological biometric can be collected by using the camera 
of the device, while the fingerprint and iris recognition need 
special equipment. On the other hand, the behavioral 
biometrics, such as gait, touch, swipe and voice can be 
collected all by the sensors of the mobile device, namely, 
accelerometer, gyroscope, touch screen and microphone 
[34]. The behavioral biometrics are starting to get attention 
as they are cost-effective; they do not need any additional 
hardware equipment, and they are lightweight in the 
implementation [30]. For instance, the touch-based solution 
e.g. swipe or keystroke, manage to authenticate the users 
unobtrusively based on their interactions with the device. 
Additionally, both physiological and behavioral biometrics 
authentication mechanisms are considered secure and 
accurate as they are unique and they cannot be shared, 
copied, lost or stolen [6]. Furthermore, they can be 
combined with another authentication means (e.g., username 
and password) for establishing multifactor authentication in 
order to enhance the security of the mobile device.. As such, 
security experts are focusing on developing such 
mechanisms as they seem that they will restructure the 
authentication landscape in the following years [6], [35], 
[36]. 
B. Means of Authorization 
Authorization is a term which is used (and often abused) 
in a very broad sense [5]. It conveys the idea that some 
means has been provided to ensure the process of granting 
or denying specific requests to obtain and use specific 
information or applications [37]. The process of permitting 
or restricting the access can happen at a granular level, such 
as per-user, per-group, and per-resources [37]. Although, 
authorization can be considered as a security objective, it is 
very often intrinsically connected to authentication. More 
precisely, one of the primary purposes of authentication is to 
facilitate access control to a resource, when an access 
privilege is linked to a particular user. For instance, a 
username-password authentication scheme that give access 
to a user’s smartphone may be viewed as the simplest 
example of an access control matrix. In the access control 
matrix, each resource has a list of users associated with it 
and successful corroboration of a user allows access to the 
authorized resources as listed for that user [5]. The most 
obvious approach is for the system to store user passwords 
cleartext in a read- and write-protected system password 
file. When the user enters the password, the system 
compares the entered password to the password file entry 
for the corresponding userid. A drawback of this method is 
that it provides no protection against privileged insiders or 
superusers (special userids which have full access privileges 
to system files and resources). Storage of the password file 
on backup media is also a security concern, since the file 
contains cleartext passwords [5]. 
According to the handbook of NIST about access control 
[38],,when implementing a secure and accurate access 
control system we should consider three abstractions: access 
control policies, models, and mechanisms. Firstly, access 
control policies are high-level requirements that specify in 
general how access is managed, for instance, who may 
access which information under what circumstances. At a 
high level, access control policies are applied through a 
mechanism that translates an access request of the user often 
in terms of a structure required by the system. A common 
example of an access control mechanism is an access 
control list. Finally, access control models bridge the gap in 
abstraction between policy and mechanism.  
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The next generation mobile devices for passenger 
identification for land and sea border control comprises a 
promising and innovative solution for accurate passenger 
identification “on the fly” while ensuring passenger´s 
comfort. However, the highly sensitive information handled 
by these devices makes them an attractive target for 
attackers. Therefore, strong user authentication and 
authorization mechanisms are required. Towards this 
direction, the objective of this work is two-fold: a) to give 
researchers a better understanding of this new type of 
devices through a series of use cases and provide an 
overview of the user authentication and authorization 
requirements, and b) to provide a foundation for organizing 
research efforts towards the design and development of 
proper user authentication and authorization mechanisms for 
next generation mobile passenger ID devices for land and 
sea border control.  
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
The research work leading to this publication has 
received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 
Research and Innovation programme under grant agreement 
H2020-MSCA-RISE-2019-eBORDER-872878. 
REFERENCES 
[1] European Commission, “Mobility and Transport Transport in the 
European Union Current Trends and Issues BACKGROUND 
INFORMATION,” Eur. Comm., no. April, p. 144, 2018. 
[2] G. Mantas, N. Komninos, J. Rodriguez, E. Logota, and H. 
Marques, “Security for 5G Communications,” in Fundamentals 
of 5G Mobile Networks, J. Rodriguez, L. Eds., John Wiley & 
Sons, Ed. Chichester, UK, 2015, pp. 207–220. 
[3] R. M. Mccabe, “Mobile ID Device Best Practice 
Recommendation Mobile ID Device Best Practice 
Recommendation,” Nist Spec. Publ., vol. 2, no. July, pp. 1–55, 
2009. 
[4] J. M. Franklin, G. Howell, S. Ledgerwood, and J. L. Griffith, 
“Draft NISTIR 8196, Security Analysis of First Responder 
Mobile and Wearable Devices.” 
[5] A. J. Menezes, P. C. Van Oorschot, and S. A. Vanstone, 
“APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY.” 
[6] S. Gupta, A. Buriro, and B. Crispo, “Demystifying 
Authentication Concepts in Smartphones: Ways and Types to 
Secure Access,” Mob. Inf. Syst., vol. 2018, 2018. 
[7] Google, “‘G suite: single sign-on on an android device,’” 2016. 
[Online]. Available: 
https://support.google.com/a/users/answer/2758865?hl=en. 
[8] M. Harbach, E. von Zezschwitz, A. Fichtner, A. De Luca, and M. 
Smith, “It’s a Hard Lock Life: A Field Study of Smartphone 
(Un)Locking Behavior and Risk Perception,” SOUPS ’14 Proc. 
Tenth Symp. Usable Priv. Secur., pp. 213–230, 2016. 
[9] J. Zhang, X. Luo, S. Akkaladevi, and J. Ziegelmayer, “Improving 
multiple-password recall: An empirical study,” Eur. J. Inf. Syst., 
vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 165–176, 2009. 
[10] G. Ye et al., “Cracking Android Pattern Lock in Five Attempts,” 
2017. 
[11] Verizon, “‘How long since you took a hard look at your 
cybersecurity?,’” 2017. 
[12] C. Braz and J. M. Robert, “Security and usability: The case of the 
user authentication methods,” ACM Int. Conf. Proceeding Ser., 
vol. 133, pp. 199–203, 2006. 
[13] S. G. Belk M., Germanakos P., Fidas C., “A Personalization 
Method Based on Human Factors for Improving Usability of 
User Authentication Tasks,” Springer, Cham, vol. 8538, no. User 
Modeling, Adaptation, and Personalization. UMAP 2014. Lecture 
Notes in Computer Science, 2014. 
[14] K. Krol, E. Philippou, E. De Cristofaro, and M. A. Sasse, “‘They 
brought in the horrible key ring thing!’ Analysing the Usability of 
Two-Factor Authentication in UK Online Banking,” 2015. 
[15] T. Zink and M. Waldvogel, “X.509 user certificate-based two-
factor authentication for web applications,” Lect. Notes 
Informatics (LNI), Proc. - Ser. Gesellschaft fur Inform., vol. 271, 
2017. 
[16] I. Traore, I. Woungang, M. S. Obaidat, Y. Nakkabi, and I. Lai, 
“Online risk-based authentication using behavioral biometrics,” 
Multimed. Tools Appl., vol. 71, no. 2, pp. 575–605, 2014. 
[17] A. J. Harris and D. C. Yen, “Biometric authentication: Assuring 
access to information,” Inf. Manag. Comput. Secur., vol. 10, no. 
1, pp. 12–19, 2002. 
[18] B. Causey, “‘Adaptive authentication: an introduction to 
riskbased authentication,’” 2013. . 
[19] J. Titcomb, “‘Hackers claim to beat iPhone X’s face id in one 
week with 115 mask,’” 2017. . 
[20] S. Kovach, “‘Business insider-Samsung’s Galaxy S8 facial 
recognition feature can be fooled with a photo,’” 2017. 
[21] A. Charles, “‘The guardian-iPhone 5S fingerprint sensor hacked 
by Germany’s Chaos Computer Club,’” 2013. . 
[22] D. McGoogan, C., & Demetriou, “Peace sign selfies could let 
hackers copy your fingerprints,” 2017. . 
[23] Apple, “About Face ID advanced technology,” 2020. [Online]. 
Available: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT208108. 
[24] J. Ribeiro, F. B. Saghezchi, G. Mantas, J. Rodriguez, and R. A. 
Abd-Alhameed, “HIDROID: Prototyping a Behavioral Host-
based Intrusion Detection and Prevention System for Android,” 
IEEE Access. 
[25] J. Ribeiro, F. B. Saghezchi, G. Mantas, J. Rodriguez, S. J. 
Shepherd, and R. A. Abd-Alhameed, “An Autonomous Host-
Based Intrusion Detection System for Android Mobile Devices,” 
Mob. Networks Appl., vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 164–172, 2020. 
[26] J. Ribeiro, G. Mantas, F. B. Saghezchi, J. Rodriguez, S. J. 
Shepherd, and R. A. Abd-Alhameed, “Towards an Autonomous 
Host-based Intrusion Detection System for Android Mobile 
Devices,” in 9th EAI International Conference on Broadband 
Communications, Networks, and Systems (BROADNETS2018), 
pp. 139–148. 
[27] M. Muaaz and R. Mayrhofer, “Smartphone-Based Gait 
Recognition: From Authentication to Imitation,” IEEE Trans. 
Mob. Comput., vol. 16, no. 11, pp. 3209–3221, 2017. 
[28] M. R. Hestbek, C. Nickel, and C. Busch, “Biometric gait 
recognition for mobile devices using wavelet transform and 
support vector machines,” 2012 19th Int. Conf. Syst. Signals 
Image Process. IWSSIP 2012, no. April, pp. 205–210, 2012. 
[29] T. Murao, K., Tobise, H., Terada, T., Iso, T., Tsukamoto, M. and 
Horikoshi, “‘Mobile phone user authentication with grip gestures 
using pressure sensors,’” Int. J. Pervasive Comput. Commun., 
vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 288–301, 2015. 
[30] A. Buriro, B. Crispo, F. DelFrari, and K. Wrona, “Hold and Sign: 
A Novel Behavioral Biometrics for Smartphone User 
Authentication,” Proc. - 2016 IEEE Symp. Secur. Priv. Work. 
SPW 2016, pp. 276–285, 2016. 
[31] B. Attaullah, S. Gupta, and B. Crispo, “Evaluation of Motion-
based Touch-typing Biometrics in Online Financial 
Environments,” pp. 219–226, 2017. 
[32] A. Buriro, S. Gupta, and B. Crispo, “Evaluation of Motion-Based 
Touch-Typing Biometrics for Online Banking,” Lect. Notes 
Informatics (LNI), Proc. - Ser. Gesellschaft fur Inform., 2017. 
[33] Y. Obuchi, “‘PDA speech database,’” 2006. . 
[34] N. Forsblom, “‘Were you aware of all these sensors in your 
smartphone?,’” 2015. [Online]. Available: 
https://blog.adtile.me/2015/11/12/wereyou-%0Aaware-of-all-
these-sensors-in-your-smartphone/. 
[35] A. De Luca, A. Hang, E. Von Zezschwitz, and H. Hussmann, “I 
feel like i’m taking selfies all day! towards understanding 
biometric authentication on smartphones,” Conf. Hum. Factors 
Comput. Syst. - Proc., vol. 2015-April, pp. 1411–1414, 2015. 
[36] T. Sloane, “‘Behavioral biometrics: the restructuring of the 
authentication landscape,’” 2017. . 
[37] NIST - National Institute of Standards and Technology, 
“Glossary | CSRC.” [Online]. Available: 
https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/access-control. 
[38] V. C. V. Hu, D. F. Ferraiolo, and D. R. Kuhn, “Assessment of 
access control systems,” Nistir 7316, p. 60, 2006. 
 
 
